The social determination of lease relations and the social problems arising from that in the ancient Rome by Molnár, Imre
IMRE MOLNÁR 
The Social Determination of Lease Relations and the Social Problems 
Arising from that in the Ancient Rome 
1. Investigating into the matter, we only point at the most important 
principles, tendencies by which a judgment may be formed anambiguously 
and fundamentally, in relation to the social connections, presenting them-
selves at the institution of lease. We speak in short of the social problems, 
presenting themselves necessarily together with the lease. At any rate, the 
Roman ruling circles themselves paid never any attention to these and, as 
a result of this, these social problems were never regulated in Rome.1 
The elaboration of the question in detail would need a separte monograph. 
Investigating into the subject, it is advisable to start from the fact that 
lease relations have fundamentally been created by requirements, presenting 
themselves in Italy at the end of the Third Century b.o.e. The wars at the 
end of the Third Century and at the beginning of the Second Century b.o.e. 
for the most part ruined the small-holder peasantry in Italy. Thus, this 
stratum had no option but to rent a farm resp. to lease their working ca-
pacity. Besides, they had to emulate with the cheap manpower of the slaves 
of considerable number.2 In this situation, they could only require the equi-
valent necessary to their self-preservation.3 These conditions fundamentally 
1 It iis written by F. Schulz: Classical Roman law (Oxford 1951), p. 545 that 
the jurists themselves wrote in the interest of the class of beati possidentes, to 
which they themselves also belonged and, therefore, their social acumen has not 
developed. According to St. Brassloff: Sozialpolitische Motive in der römischen 
Rechtsentwicklung (Wien, 1933), p. 15, we cannot speak about social law in case 
of Romans. 
2 According to H. Dernburg: Pandekten II» (Berlin, 1889) p. 301, in Rome, 
where slave-work prevailed, the contract concerning wages had but a subordi-
nate importance. — I. V. Shereshevsky: Pravovoe regulirovanie "nayomnogo 
truda" v Rime (Legal regulation of wage-work in Rome), VÍDI. 1955 considers as 
a principle of No. 1 that, apart from the generality of slave-work, the wage-work 
was rare in Rome. — Cf. Pólay: A dáciai viaszostáblák szerződései (Contracts on 
waxen tablets in Dacia) Budapest, 1972, p. 160; J.A.C. Thomas: Locatio and 
Operae. DIDR 64 (1961) p. 255. 
3 M. Rostovtzeff: Gesellschaft und Wirtschaft im römischen Kaiserrech, 
Bände 1-2 (Leipzig, 1929) expounds on page 7 of vol. II that, in addition to the 
nomerous slaves, those belonging to the poor free strata, whose number was 
similarly high, could set up a claim only to such a compensation like the cost of 
the supply, feeding of slaves. That is to say, it was only enough for their cost of 
living. Vol. II, p. 178 expounds, further on, that in century I resp. II b.o.e., the 
wage of the unskilled workman was so low that it could hardly cover the 
feeding of the family. Cf. in this relation: Pólay: Op. cit, pp. 181ff. 
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changed but a very little in the course of the entire Roman history.4 Thus, 
the lessee was always at the mercy of the rich.5 
The imperialist Rome did not bother about the pauper. It became a prin-
ciple that "the rich: purchase, the poor; lease". Owing to this, the social 
estimation of tenants was always unfavourable.6 According to the ideology 
developed by the imperialistic conquests the fundamental means of acquiring 
goods was seen by the Romans not in work but in pillaging the goods of 
their enemies.7 Gaius expressed this in the way: "Maxima sua esse credebant, 
quae ex hostibus cepissent" (4.16). The opinion about every kind of locatio 
conductio was, of course, not uniform. The estimation of an enterpriser 
working with his own means may have been much higher than of those 
performing a wage-work by the day.8 The tenant of land was also held in 
higher esteem than he who could not help but offer to sale alone his working 
capacity.9 Without wishing to establish any pattern, we may set down as a 
fact that the worker was on the lowest degree of the social ladder, the 
leaseholder stood somewhere higher and, from time to time, the enterpriser 
had the advantage of a more favourable social apprecation. And even, the 
social appreciation of the more opulent enterprisers was different from that 
of the persons of locatio conductio rei and I.e. operarum.10 
2. The question arises, why the Roman public opinion assumed so 
negative standpoint in connection with the tenantship resp. why it despised 
those performing a work for somebody else. In connection with this question 
it also arose whether the Romans considered every work as humiliating. Our 
answer to the latter question is a definite no. In the consciousness of the 
4 Beginning from Century III b.o.e., the economical life of Rome lied on the 
production of slaves. Thus, the importance of free tenants always fell into the 
background, apart from certain fluctuation. 
5 Schulz: Op. cit. p. 545. Tha parties connected their contracts according 
to their choice. This, however, meant that, in every case, the interests of the 
capitalist prevailed. 
6 F. Oertmann (Die Volskwirtschaftslehre des Corpus Juris Civilis (Berlin, 
1895), p. 77 says: according to "veteres" an honest person did not deal with such 
a low activity as locatio conductio. The situation did not change much in the 
imperial period, either. And even, particularly from Century III b.o.e., it continued 
growing worse, when the various subjugated layers of coloni took shape. Cf. Brósz 
R.: Nem teljesjogú polgárok a római jogforrásokban (Citizens with not-full powers 
in the Roman sources of law). Budapest, 1964, pp. 180ff. 
7 According to Oertmann: Op. cit. p. 77, in case of Romans, the role of work 
and acquiring activity consisted of rapere, occupare. The so-called "Raubsystem" 
was legally possible. 
s Thomas BIDR 54 (1961) p. 237. The enterprising work was more respectable 
in the eyes of Romans. 
9 De Robertis, F.: Lavoro e lavoratori nel mondo romano (Bari, 1963) pp. 
132ff. expounds that the occupation with wage-work was so much despised in 
the eyes of society that the wage-worker almost sank down to the level of slaves. 
Visky deals in his thesis for candidate's degree entitled "Intellectual work and 
ars liberális in the sources of Roman law" (pp. l l f f ) with the appreciation of 
physical work. He is pointing at that the wage-worker was almost treated like 
the slave. This is referred to by Seneca's (De beneficiis 3, 22) term that "Servus 
perpetuus mercennarius", i.e. the slave is a perpetual wage-worker. 
Visky: Festők, szobrászok és alkotásaik a római jog tükrében (Painters, 
sculptors and their products in the mirror of Roman law). Budapest, 1968 (Sepa-
rate reprint from "Antik Tanulmányok", 1968, vol. XV, No. 2), p. 191. He admits 
that e.g. painters, sculptors also belonged to the occupations of lower rank, i.e. 
they were enterprisers. Nevertheless, it refers to a certain appreciation that the 
artisans were released from bearing diverse burdens. — Cf. Pólay: Op. cit., p. 181. 
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leading 'strata of the Rome, having outgrown from a patriarchal peasant 
State,11 -the peasant work survived as the true, the noblest occupation. Cato 
wrote in the introduction of his work De agr.: "Et virum bonumque 
laudabant, ita laudabant: bonum agricolam bonumque colonum" (Praef. 2). 
The meaning of the word colonus was, namely, in that time,, still "farmer", 
"peasant holder".12 Cato was speaking in the further part of the introduction 
of the work, as well, about the farmer (of course, of the peasant, cultivating 
his own land) as about the best soldier, a man of common1 sense. After about 
at least a hundred years, a similar opinion was also represented about the 
peasant work by T, Varro: "Viri magni nostri maiores non .sine causa 
praeponebant rusticos rom.anos urbanis" (De r,r.2.1). This sentence contains, 
of course, also Varro's detestation towards the parasite townsmen. They 
were, at any rate, not averse to such a work, either, the purpose of which 
was to have a large homestead cultivated by slaves and get a great profit 
in this way (Cicero, De off. 1.151). To work or let work in his own, was 
not at all "inhonestum". But anybody, doing this for money, to anybody 
else in the frame of I.e., was censured,13 According to the .official standpoint, 
reflected by the works of certain authors in the end of the republican age 
and at the beginning of Principate, the acquisition by wage-work is unworthy 
of a free man. The mental work of free people is no "subject of purchase" 
but it is remunerated by a fee (Cic. de. off. 1.150-151). 
The origion of the social public opinion is that poor people could not 
help but always lease (a land,, premises) or — what is even worse — to 
¡hire themselves resp. their work. Thus leasing became the concomitant of 
poverty. In the eyes of. the Roman society, prepared for conquest, property 
met with .recognition, even if it was robbed. Those having no property, ..had 
to get anyhow, into a kind of tenantship, for the sake of their subsistence. 
These were considered as almost similar to slaves or they stood not more 
than one step higher on the social ladder than those.14 De Robertis tried, to 
prove that the opinion of the ruling circles about work was different from 
that of subjected'people performing the work.15 We'think it is possible to 
agree with this but this had no legal importance. The slave did not despise 
his companion because of being a slave himself, as well, and a poor man 
has not contempted his co-tenant, with whom he lived in a common tene-
ment house. But even the tenant considered the slave as inferior to himself. 
The decisive social value judgment always originated from the most moneyed 
people, from the ruling class, and had a profound effect on. the whole 
society. That is to Say, thé tenant did not despise himself or his co-tenant 
but he who stood a degree higher, did this. All this followed from the ideo-
logy of the ruling strata of Rome, according to which the plunderer, the 
robber were appreciated in Rome, but the physical worker was not. This 
11 Käser M.: Römische Rechtsgeschichte« (Göttingen 1967) pp. 26ff. 
12 Cf. Brösz: Op. cit., p. 169. 
is H. Kreller: Römisches Recht. Wien, 1950, vol. II, p. 359. D. Nörr: Zur 
sozialen und ^rechtlichen Bewertung der freien Arbeit in Rom. SZ 82 (1965), pp. 74ff. 
14 According to De Robertis (Lavoro, pp. 132ff), the free well-to-do people 
disdained the wage-worker very much. They considered him as an individual 
who sank down'to the level of slaves. In connection with this, cf. P.olay: Op. cit. 
pp. 162ff. — Thomas, BIDR 64 (1961) pp. 235ff. 
!5 De Robertis: Lavoro, pp. 21-90. 
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attitude was reflected in law-making itself, as well, because the jurists also 
belonged , to the ruling class.16 It is said with reason by Brôsz that lease 
was an expressly exploiting contract in Rome.17 
3. It can be proved on the basis of sources in the following way that 
lease in Rome had an antisocial exploiting character. The tenant is no 
possessor but only a holder (detainer, detentor):18 "Possidere autem videtur 
quisque non solum si ipse possideat sed et si eius nomine aliquis in posses-
sione sit, licet is eius urbi subiectus non sit, qualis est colonus et inquilinus" 
(Inst.4.15.5). I.e., the owner was only protected from different external 
impacts, the tenant was not. The tenant could freely be thrown, chased out 
of the landed property. And even the owner himself could do this and, 
therefore, the tenant was entirely defenceless (D. 43. 16. 12. 2. 60. 1. — 41. 2. 
10. l)i It is closely connected with this principle, as well, that if the lessor sold 
the subject of lease during the tenure of land or house, the new owner 
could eject the tenant, who could only appeal to the lessor for compensa-
tion. And the situation was the same if the owner permitted somebody usu-
fructuary right on his thing or the registration of mortgage.19 According to 
an edict of Alexander Severus (C. 4. 65. 9 : "Emptori quidem fundi necesse 
non est stare colonum, cui prior dominus locavit", and according to that in 
D. 7. 1. 59, "potest ' ususfructuarius conductorem repellere". We may find 
similar opinions in the,following sources, as well: D. 19. 2. 25. 1. — 19. 1. 
13. 30. — 43. 16. 22. — 19. 2. 32. 
The owner could always abrogate the contract, expel the tenant and this 
could do nothing more than giving rise to an action for damaiges from the 
lessor. This is referred to by the following expressions: "locatio precariive 
rogatio ita facta, quoas is qui earn locasset dedissetve, fellet" (D. 19. 2. 4) or: 
"si dominus istum colonum fundi eiectùm.. ." (D. 19. 2. 61. pr.). Roman 
law did not know, otherwise, any notice period, as a favour, granted in the 
interest of the tenant. 
The sources speak unambiguously about that, in order to assure the 
collection of rent, ' the owner was due to a mortgage on the invecta, illata 
of the tenant, as well as on the fruit, by the tenant.20 This meant the most 
severe subjection of the tenant (D. 19. 2. 13. 11. — 19, 2. 24. 1. — C. 4. 
65. 5. — 4. 65. 16. — D. 13. 7. 11. 5.). According to Cato (150. 2: 
"Conductor,, , donee domino satisfecerit aut solveriti pignori esto", i.e., this 
legal institution already existed in Century II b.o.e., as well. 
The rules of bearing the danger of rent put, too, a very heavy burden 
on the tenant and, from time to time, they departed, too, from the general 
rule,.to the account of the workman21 (D. 19. 2. 15. 21. — 38. — 1. 15. — 
19. 2. 62), and even remissio mercedis meant from the time a burden, 
10 Schulz: Op. cit. p. 545 — Käser: Das römische Rivatrecht I.2 (München 
1971), pp. 262 ff. 
*7 Brósz, R.—Pólay, E.: Római jog (Roman law). Budapest, 1974, p. 438. 
i? Kaser: RPR I2, p. 563. — Brósz: Op.« cit., p. 165. 
... 18 Cf. Brósz: Op. cit., p. 165. — Kaser: RPR I2, p. 567, — Brósz—Pólay: Op. 
cit., p. 438. 
20 Professor Brósz (Op. cit., p. 166) convincingly presents the class character 
oL the. law of mortgage, taking shape in the relation between the powerful lessor 
and the poor leaseholder, afflicting the handicapped leaseholder. 
21 Brósz—Pólay: Op. cit., p. 439. 
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beacause the cancelling of rent would only have been really favourable if it 
had been of definitive "character.2? 
The colonus, the' condutor operis and the locator operarum were-touched 
very: severely by the leability of cUstodia, as Well.23 These liable persons 
could only exculpate therriselves by referring to vis inaior if the things irt 
their custody are lost. This rule was particularly disàdVarttagëous in case of 
a jobbing tailor and a dry-cleâner (D. 19. 2. 25. 8.). - ' ; 
We can read an interesting rule from Iavôlënus (D. 19. 2. 21,). If 
somebody buys a piece of ground and does not pay the whole of purchase 
price, he is obliged also to pay rent,- as long as his debt is no t discharged. 
The disadvantage presents itself therein that this could just be paid from 
the fuit, of the .land but, in this way,: he is obliged to fulfil his commitments 
in two. different forms: to pay the arrears of the purchase -price7 and the 
rent, as well. As a result of this, the income from the land is burdened 
twofold.24 Compulsory measures against, workers and.¿nterprisers are to bé 
found in Cato's works, as well (144, 145). If workers and labourers do : not 
comply wit the .instructions given by the owner, they are ; not due to any 
wage for that work-day. In the preclassical period; taking of an oath: was 
also required-concerning performing the work. And if somebody refused this, 
he did not obtain the w;ork carried out . that day. We can establish from 
Cato's text that; enterprisers and workers were punished by losing the fee 
resp. wage immediately if they did not perform the work according to the 
wishes of the owner. These measures refer to the despotic measures,. as; well, 
originating from Locatio conductio. .. ~ . 
Reading attentively the rules of I.e., we meet several more such provisions 
which clearly show the class character of lease.25 The further discussion 
of these rules does not seem to be necessary. On the, basis of those , told 
over, it is namely unambiguously evident that the equality of contracting 
parties before the law is missing. We offer our; remarks on the disadvan-
tageous legai consequences devolving from I.e. on the economically weaker 
party in the concrete places later, in the course of investigating into the 
sourcees. •• : . . . ;; . ; 
4. In the foregoing, we have surveyed the sorces and literary standpoints 
from which the class character of locatio conductio iâ to be seen. The 
objectivity of these is caused by the very fact that even the most eminent 
22 investigating into , the problem of rem'issio mercedis, we have, at any rate, 
to take into consideration the standpoint of C. Àlzon, expounded on pp. 317ff 
of his paper "Les risques dans la locatio-conductio, LABEO 12(1966), according 
to which in case of a poor crop the tenant had to pay the rent according to 
the general rule, thus the payment from thë crop of the succeeding years ; was 
after all, to the advantage of the renter. 
23 Correspondigly Brôszï Op. cit , pp. 164ff. • - , ^ 
24 By this rule, too the economically stronger person was always protected. 
It could namely occur that the leaseholder scraped up a part of the purchase on 
the piece of ground, leased by him, and tried-to buy the ground. As, however, 
he had not enough money, he could only pay a part of price of the ground -but"; 
in addition to this, he was obliged to pay the high rent, as well. This was 
a double drawback. : • ; " 
, : 25 Brôsz: OpJ cit., pp.- 164ff convincingly presents the rules; which reflect thë 
disadvantageous situation of the leaseholder. Thus he points out - that the lease-
holder acquires thé ownership of the crop only by à quasi tradition' with the 
¡allowance of the owner. The hostility bètwéen the landholder and the neighbour 
Was regarded as the result of the culpa of the • leaseholder. It is particularly 
realistic to apply the régula "omne quod in^diï ïciâtur'solo icëdit^ ténancy/ - : 
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bourgeois scholars, dealing with the history of Roman law, almost; without 
any exception, pointed out the miserable situation of the tenant resp. :the 
wage-earner. This picture, connected with lease, can at any rate only be 
complete if we refer in a few sentences to the conditions of livelihood 
existing in the territory, of the Empire, as well. In the material of writers, 
jurists and non-jurists, there are hardly any data available which could show 
us the way defnitely in this question. Thus, we shall rely on the provisions 
of Diocletian, fixing the maximum prices and rents (CIL III. 824-841, as well 
as on the documents, containing data concerning the living conditions. Lite-
rature has often- dealt with this question, as well. Here, however, we must 
be content with the most essential establishments. 
János Szilágyi26 is investigating in his paper into the conditions of ¿arn-
ings in Acquincum, in the period of the Empire. There are analysed in a 
similar way the conditions of earnings in the ádjaeent Dacia on the basis of 
labour contracts concluded with mine-workers in the Alburnus farmstead.27 
Blümner elaborated the provisions of the emperor Diocletian, fixing 
maximum prices and rents. This work shows us the way satisfyingly in 
more than one relation.28 
We should like to emphasize only a few exámples in order to illustrate 
these. Szilágyi29 informs us that in the First Céntury the day-wages of free 
workmen rangéd from 0,25 to 1 denarius, dependinig on the demand and 
supply in the various provinces. On the other hand, the price of a gala dress 
was 75 den., the same was the price of a porker. The annual rent of a smal-
ler dwelling-house was 400 denarii. It is to be seen from these prices that 
ä worker had to work fór three resp. four months if he wantéd to buy a 
¡suit of clothes or a pig. And he could never rent a house because he did 
not earn so much. Whereas a corn-merchant closed the year with a profit 
of 2000 denarii.30 The disproportion is striking, particülarly taking into 
consideration that the maximűm of a lawyer's fee was fixed on ten 
thousand sest. in the time of Claudius (Suetonius Claud. 15. — Tacitus Ann. 
11.6), corresponding to 2500 denarii31. In the second century, however, 
taking into consideration the conditions in Dacia, a worker could buy e.g. 52 
white loaves from his semiannual income óf 105 denarii (CIL III. p. 953) 
which covered not more than his bread-needs for a year.32 
The situation has not changed after the price-reform of Diocletian, 
either. The daily wage of a farm labourer, driver if animals is 25 new 
denarii, that of a lime-burner 50, of a house-painter 75, of a picture-painter 
2« Szilágyi, J.: Aquincum. Budapest, 1956. 
27 pólay: Op. cit., pp. 190ff. , 
28 H. Blümner: Der Maximaltarif des Diokletian (Berlin 1894). 
2» szilágyi: Op, cit., p. 74. 
so Szilágyi: Op. cit., p. 74. 
»i Bernhart: Handbuch zur Münzkunde. Festband (Halle, 1926). pp. 18-26 ex-
pounds that, in the days of Augustus, 1 aureus = 25 denarius = 100 sestertius = 
400 as. Cf. Blümner: Op. cit., p. 120. 
32 pólay: Op. cit., p. Í91, foot-note 47. — Cf. S. Mrozek: Die Arbeitsverhält-
nisse in den Goldbergwerken Daziens. Gesellschaft und Recht im griechisch-rö-
mischen Altertum. II (Berlin, 1969) pp. 147ff. — G. Popa: Tabele cerate Transil-
.vania (Bucharest, 1890) pp. 132ff. — Rostovtzeff (Op. cit., vol. II, p. 178). He 
carefully studies the question concerning the different Eastern Provinces of the 
Empire and establishes that the daily wage of an unskilled worker was only 
enough for the minimum of subsistence. 
22 8 ; ; 
150 den. On the other hand, 1 kg (about 3 pounds) pork cost 36, a pair of 
men's sandal 120 new denarii.33 
The simple, unskilled workman could not buy 1 kg pork from his one-
day earning. Thus, he could at most procure his own food from his income. 
The other family-members had to work, as well, if they wanted to survive.84 
The situation of the lease-holder (tenant of land) was somewhat better. 
He produced, after all, the goods for himself in the land, taken for lease. 
Nevertheless, from the provisions in the period of the empire, which began 
to prescribe the binding of the colonus to the soil, owing to the escapes, we 
may draw the conclusion that their situation may have been not much 
better than that of day-wage men.85 
This social picture is reflected by a sentence of Ulpian (D. 7. 8. 4. 
pr.): "Sed et cum his, quos loco servorum in operis habet habitabit, licet 
liberi sint vel servi alieni". 
83 Szilágyi: Op. cit., p. 75. — Blümner (Op. cit., pp. 177ff) expounds that the 
value of denarius, taking place in the price regulation issued by Diocletian was 
not identical with the value of denarius in circulation. This was only a unit 
of calculation, the so-called denarius communis, a part 1/50000 of 33 g gold. 
34 Pólay: Op. cit., p. 191. 
a5 Brassloff: Op. cit., p. 77. — Brósz: Op. cit., p. 179. — Mayer—Maly, Th.: 
Locatio-conductio (Wien—München, 1956), p. 225. 
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